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Introduction  
On April 2, 1982, Argentina—then governed by a military junta—surprised the international 
community by launching an invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands in the South Atlantic.[1] 
The junta, not expecting the British to launch a full-scale counter-invasion, planned the invasion 
as a “touch and go” operation, intending to occupy the islands for a short period of time and force 
the British to the negotiating table.[2] However, the British responded by sending a large naval 
task force to reclaim the islands. The British began military operations on May 1, and on June 13 
the Argentines surrendered.  
The Argentine armed forces suffered a dismal defeat, with only the air force performing with any 
degree of competency. The military was fully discredited, and had no choice after the war but to 
announce plans for a return to democracy the following year.  
Contemporary analysis tends to view the invasion as a scapegoat for the military regime in order 
to bolster nationalism throughout Argentine society and divert attention away from the junta’s 
failing national reorganization plan, the Proceso de Reoganización Nacional. However, such 
analysis is risky, for it ignores key problems in the international system representing a rift 
between the developed and developing worlds. This paper will seek to analyze the 
Falklands/Malvinas War from a broad context of international relations by looking at the specific 
intentions and motivations for invasion. By uncovering why the junta decided to fight a war with a 
major world power over a chain of relatively worthless islands in the middle of the South Atlantic, I 
shall show that the international system does not understand the full weight third world nations 
attach to various objectives.  
This is dangerous. If developed and developing nations continue to have discordant perceptions 
of the relative weight of gains and losses in international fora, then a strong potential exists for 
conflict—as seen in 1982.  
 
Background - Argentina 
Argentina is unique in Latin America in both its self perception and its outlook, based largely on 
its historical greatness and decline in the 20th century. This fact must be considered when 
analyzing foreign policy decisions Argentina undertakes. Though independent of colonial rule in 
1810, state power was not consolidated and centralized until the middle of the 19th century, at 
which point Argentina entered the world community on a basis of agricultural export into the 
international division of labor. It grew exponentially, at such a rate that by the early 20th century it 
was among the most advanced nations in the world. By 1914 Buenos Aires had grown to be the 
second largest city on the Atlantic seaboard, with grand architecture and infrastructure to match 
European capitals. Argentine per capita GDP matched that of Germany, and surpassed Spain, 
Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland. Furthermore it ranked among the world’s top exporters: number 
one in corn, second in wool, and third in live cattle and horses.[3]  
But starting in the late 1920s, Argentina entered a decline in prosperity, and since the 1930s has 
endured a rollercoaster ride of economic performance. Following the worldwide depression of the 
1930s, Argentina endured cycles of boom and bust as regimes and economic models changed, 
with each downturn leaving the nation worse off overall; an ever downward trend. Argentina fell 
from the position of a rising world power in the 1920s to a third world nation in the span of sixty or 
so years.  
Another historical dilemma facing Argentina is its perception of territorial losses, dating back to 
the colonial legacy inherited from the Spanish as the center of the La Plata viceroyalty. This 
occurred through the 19th century as the varying nations of South America consolidated their 
borders following independence and has continued through numerous border disputes, including 
the aforementioned dispute over the Malvinas and several disputes with Chile and Brazil. In 
response to a 1985 Gallup poll asking Argentines, “Do you believe Argentina has won or lost 
territories throughout its history,” 73.6% of respondents answered that it had. This perception 
increased with education level, pointing to the role the educational system in Argentina plays in 
perpetuating this perception.[4]  
A study of Argentine history textbooks from 1879 to 1986 confirms this fact. Carlos Escudé notes 
an interesting trend which has potentially profound ramifications for prospect theory’s look at 
Argentine foreign policy. In the context of Argentina’s cultural dynamics, 19th Century gains are 
transformed into losses, while in the 20th Century, when there were no losses or gains before the 
1970s, an imaginary territory was invented which was nonetheless computed as a gain.[5] Thus, 
any coming to grips with the fact that these imaginary territories[6] were not part of Argentina 
would be computed as a loss.  
Argentina’s status as a once-great power in the early 20th century and inflated sense of national 
boundaries have combined to create a unique self-image of greatness. As discussed earlier, 
losses are accepted very slowly, and it seems that Argentina has yet to accept its decline in 
status throughout the twentieth century. This brand of nationalism, called a “national superiority 
complex” by Escudé[7] and “exceptionalism” by Joseph Tulchin[8] creates a highly exaggerated 
sense of Argentina’s real place in the world. According to a series of IPSA polls, a majority of the 
Argentine population think[9]:  
1. That the world has a great deal to learn from Argentina;  
2. That Argentina has nothing to learn from the world;  
3. That Argentina is the most important country in Latin America;  
4. That in no country [in the world] do people live as well as in Argentina;  
5. That Argentina deserves an important place in the world; and  
6. That Argentina’s scientists and professionals are the best in the world.  
This strong perception of greatness fosters ardent nationalism; understandably, the people 
genuinely believe in the greatness of their nation. 
I shall maintain that the junta acted as a singular decision-making entity rather than as a 
conglomeration of individual decision makers with differing interests. While this is a large 
assumption given the nature of the Argentine governing junta, it is a safe one as the decisions to 
invade the islands and fight the British created a unifying effect in the junta, thus counteracting 
the factionalization which had been occurring prior to the invasion.  
Theory  
Prospect theory has developed as a response to rational-choice theory, postulating that 
individuals tend to view choices in terms of relative rather than absolute utility; viewed relative to 
a status quo (see Table 1):[10]  
 
Table 1: Gains and Losses as Relative to Status Quo 
Any action which would result in a loss relative to their perception of status quo would be weighed 
more heavily than an action which results in a gain relative to the status quo. To this status quo, 
people attach a perception of legitimacy; this status quo is their rightful place. This is known as a 
“status-quo bias” and has been rigorously tested.[11] Gains relative to the status quo are 
acceptable, but losses are not only unacceptable but must be recouped in order to return to the 
“rightful position.”  
Therefore, losses tend to loom larger than gains, explaining why the value curve is steeper on 
regarding losses (see Table 2), and individuals are likely to pursue risky behavior to recoup 
losses and return to the status quo position:[12]  
 
Table 2: Prospect Theory Value Function  
However, when pursuing gains, people tend towards being more cautious, for fear of losing what 
they already have.  
Another interesting phenomenon is the manner in which perceptions of status quo are updated to 
assimilate gains and losses, creating a basis for future decisions. Gains are swiftly assimilated 
and the status quo is adjusted to accommodate these gains. However, due to a phenomenon 
known as the endowment effect,[13] people tend to update their status quo reference point 
regarding losses much more slowly. Therefore, the losses remain more dominant, and people are 
more likely to seek recovering losses and returning to the status quo.[14]  
These findings lead to some ultimate conclusions of individual risk taking propensity when facing 
gains and losses. Given that individuals value gains and update their reference point to assimilate 
gains rapidly, they are less likely to take risks when in the domain of gains. Thus, they are risk 
averse, and will pursue what they consider to be sure bets as opposed to risking a loss of their 
gains. On the converse, individuals who suffer losses and find themselves in the domain of losses 
are likely to pursue risk seeking behavior, due to the fact that losses loom larger than gains and 
that their perception of status quo updates very slowly facing losses due to the endowment effect. 
They “hedge their bets on the unlikely prospect of recouping the status quo, which risky choices 
offer, rather than accept a certain yet limited loss.”[15] Based on the prospect theory value curve, 
we can transpose risk vs. gains onto similar axes (see Table 3):  
 
Table 3: Domain vs. Risk Curve  
The curve is similar in shape to a value curve, accounting for the increased risk seeking 
propensity facing losses and aversion facing gains.  
Though originally designed for application in financial situations, the authors recognized its 
broader application into political and economic fields and the theory has been built upon by others 
since its original inception.[16] This model for decision-making shall be applied to the case of the 
South Atlantic War in order to:  
1. Demonstrate that while the model fits the typical perception of the war (an international 
risk) in response to a declining domestic position (response to a loss), this is an 
inaccurate analysis;  
2. Illustrate that the war included two major decisions by the junta, that to invade and that to 
stay and fight;  
3. Demonstrate that both decisions were made based on a perception of loss or gain, thus 
validating the central theory.    
 
 
The Invasion as a Ruse: Refuting the Common Understanding  
The idea that the junta invaded the Falklands to increase domestic legitimacy is put forth by many 
contemporary analysts.[17] Two sets of facts make this motivation appear to be dominant in the 
regime’s decision making process: the lack of legitimacy and poor performance of the junta at the 
start of 1981, and the effect the invasion did produce in domestic Argentine society.  
In looking at the war through the lens of history, it very much appears that this may have been the 
motivating factor for the decision to “recover” the islands. The regime, initially successful in its 
plan to reorganize Argentine society to reclaim the “greatness” of the nation, had fallen on its face. 
The legacy of the dirty war was beginning to build. Opposition to the regime was increasing and 
becoming more public which was evidenced in March 30, 1982, when the military was forced to 
suppress a massive labor demonstration in Buenos Aires, the largest public demonstration since 
the 1976 coup. The economy had been collapsing since the end of 1979.[18] Under these 
circumstances, it is understandable that the population was upset with the performance of the 
junta. That the junta would seek a distraction seems to be a plausible argument.  
In looking at the war after the fact, the rush of public support following the invasion may create 
the perception that the regime sought to bolster public support through invasion. Massive 
demonstrations took place in the streets and the Plaza de Mayo became filled with flag waving 
citizens showing their support for the regime and for the invasion. Even the highly educated 
sectors of society showed their unconditional support. As one professor said:  
We are drunken with patriotic feelings, we are standing proud, because we are witnesses and 
participants of a rescue promised to the blood of our forebears. National joy is as wide as 
understandable.[19]  
Leaders of the dominant political parties[20] gave their consent and active collaboration to the 
regime in the war effort, sending missions abroad to gain diplomatic support for the Argentine 
position. Perhaps more telling, those who had been persecuted by the military regime gave their 
whole-hearted support to the regime in response to the invasion. Saúl Ubaldini, leader of the 
labor confederation (CGT) had been imprisoned following the March 30 labor demonstration. Yet 
he offered to head the union delegation traveling to the islands for the inauguration of the military 
governor. The outpouring of popular support for the regime once the invasion had been 
completed was enormous, and unfortunately for the junta and for Argentina, unexpected.  
The fact is this regime had no need to generate consensus among the Argentine population, for it 
was a highly repressive authoritarian regime. The dirty war had created a climate of fear so 
strong that civil society essentially fell apart. The press was censoring itself out of fear caused by 
the “disappearances” of several journalists who had criticized the regime.[21] As John Arquilla 
and María Rasmussen argue, “after 1976, military juntas could afford to govern without being 
liked.”[22] This was apparent in their economic policies, which were carried out by implementing 
harsh austerity measures severely affecting the living standards of most Argentines. Yet because 
the military had so successfully demobilized the popular classes through fear and repression, it 
had no need to formulate policy to “soften the blow.” Rather, it stuck to its reform plan in spite of 
the social costs, illustrating both its insulation from social pressures and its determination to “stay 
the course.”[ 23]  
Arguing that the military sought to divert attention away from poor economic conditions in 1982 
when it ignored public complaints in 1976 is not plausible. While several structural factors 
changed between 1976 and 1982, Galtieri demonstrated in March that his regime was still one to 
be feared and that the Proceso would continue in spite of enduring hardship. Therefore, the 
military was not seeking a “scapegoat” to divert public attention away from a collapsing economy, 
because it was generally unconcerned with public opinion or issues of legitimacy. As Joseph 
Tulchin puts it, “there was no formal political opposition to the regime, and there were no 
organized groups that systematically subjected the actions of the government to public discussion 
and whose criticism represented a factor that the government had to take into account.”[24] There 
were other reasons the military decided to “recover” the Malvinas, and they had both domestic 
and international dimensions.  
Separate Processes for Invasion and Fighting 
With the commonly held view of war as a coup de théâtre to increase domestic opinion of the 
military regime discredited, it is now necessary to analyze the decision-making of the junta in its 
conduct of the war. This requires a two-fold analysis, for the junta made two major choices that 
led to war. The first was the decision to carry out the “touch and go” operation in order to recover 
the islands. The second was the decision to stay and fight once it became apparent that the 
British intended to seek recourse through military, rather than diplomatic, means. The junta had 
not intended to fight a war,[25] so why did it suddenly decide to fight one? Prospect theory 
provides valuable insight into the decision making process of the junta in both instances.  
A “Touch and Go Operation”  
The junta had been seeking territorial gains since coming to power in 1976. Furthermore, the 
junta laid forth the securing of national frontiers, with both Chile on the Beagle Channel and in the 
Malvinas, as one of its goals in March 1976.[26] The military government intended to engage the 
British in bilateral negotiations over the South Atlantic dispute, which had commenced in 1979. 
But by February 1982, it was obvious that negotiations were going nowhere. To make matters 
worse, the year 1983 was to mark the 150th anniversary of the British occupation of the islands, 
providing the possibility of an increased British sense of ownership, further reducing the Argentine 
bargaining position and curtailing an ultimately favorable resolution. In 1977, Argentina and Chile 
had nearly gone to war over islands in the Beagle Channel, following a decision by the 
International Court of Justice awarding the islands to Chile. War was avoided with the decision to 
submit the case to the Vatican for papal mediation, the results of which were expected to be 
released with Chile again as the victor. Finally, the regime was concerned over its claims to 
Antarctica. With the Beagle Channel dispute expected to end in Chile’s favor, a demand by that 
state of a 200 mile projection from its shores into the South Atlantic would cut off Argentina from 
her Antarctic claims, a fact compounded by the upcoming 1991 revision of the Antarctic treaty.[27] 
Given Argentina’s perception that these territories were already theirs, this would represent a 
major loss.[28]  
The junta was losing prestige and territory that it felt rightfully belonged to Argentina. In order to 
reconcile this fact and save face, the regime engaged in risk-seeking international behavior, by 
launching an invasion. The stated purpose of the invasion was not to initiate a war, but merely to 
force the British to continue negotiations and grant the Argentines an “ace in hole” at the table. 
However, the fact that the British were not expected to retaliate militarily does not negate the fact 
that the move was a risky one. While the junta did not expect a British military retaliation, the 
possibility existed and it certainly was not guaranteed that the British would sit idle. The regime 
was gambling on British indifference to the ultimate outcome of the negotiations and overall lack 
of resolve to reclaim the islands.  
The junta may have accurately perceived signals indicating that the British were not interested in 
maintaining a presence on the Falklands and therefore would not respond militarily should the 
Argentines take the islands by force.[29] However, in the run up to the invasion, an incident 
involving the South Georgia Islands[30] gave the junta a clear indication that the planned 
operation was riskier than initially thought and should have raised a red flag in the Casa Rosada. 
The navy decided to use this incident to increase Argentina ’s South Atlantic claims prior to 
launching its invasion, expecting a minimal short run diplomatic response from the British and 
long run leverage over the British in the ultimate negotiated outcome of the entire dispute. 
Unfortunately, the junta was mistaken, and the British sent a marine detachment, aboard HMS 
Endurance, to float off the coast of South Georgia and await orders.  
Knowing that this small provocation had resulted in a military response informed the junta that 
there was a better than anticipated chance that the British would respond to an Argentine 
invasion with force. This fact was made blatantly obvious the night prior to the invasion in a 
conversation between General Galtieri and President Reagan. Reagan told Galtieri, “If the only 
option is a military invasion, I assure you, Mr. President, that the British will respond militarily… 
Ms. [sic] Thatcher is a decisive woman and she will have no choice but to fight back.”[31] Cleary 
the Argentines had enough indications to understand that there was a risk that the British would 
respond with force, yet they felt this acceptable in order to recoup their perceived losses.  
Why Fight a War? 
On April 5, 1982, a British naval task force set sail from Portsmouth headed for the South Atlantic 
and on April 7, the British announced a two hundred mile exclusionary zone around the islands. 
At this point the junta had no choice but to realize that their gamble had failed and that their 
action had provoked a military response, the stated goal of forcing negotiations was a failure. 
Rather than causing the British to return to the negotiating table in a disadvantageous position, 
the junta found itself on the verge of going to war with one of its oldest allies and one of the most 
powerful nations in the world. However, the regime found itself playing a two-level game, and had 
cornered itself domestically, finding itself in the domain of gains among its “constituency.”  
While the junta had expected an outpouring of public support for the invasion based on the 
constant nationalistic fervor of the Argentine people, the magnitude of the outpouring was really 
quite surprising. For starters, 250,000 people crowded into the Plaza de Mayo on April 6, waving 
flags in support of the occupation. As previously stated, prisoners of the March 30 labor 
demonstrations volunteered to help fight for a regime they had previously denounced. Even 
exiled guerilla fighters volunteered to come back to Argentina and fight for this cause, in spite of 
the fact that repatriation would subject them to the death penalty for their prior actions. The press 
fueled this fervor with commentary:  
In Argentina, it is not a military dictatorship that is fighting. It is the whole people, her women, her 
children, her old people, regardless of their political persuasion. Opponents to the regime like 
myself are fighting for our dignity, fighting to extricate the last vestiges of colonialism. Don’t be 
mistaken, Europe, it is not a dictatorship that is fighting for the Malvinas, it is the whole nation.[32]  
There is controversy over the intent of this public outpouring. To a large degree, it appears to be 
dual-natured, granting support to the war effort and to the regime which initiated the war effort. 
For example, a political commentary in La Nacion exhorted “old wounds will be repaired.”[33] 
However, many felt that the junta, while right in invading the Malvinas, was still wrong overall. 
Many of those in the Plaza de Mayo were chanting “Malvinas, sí! El gobierno military, NO”.[34]  
That the invasion actually made the Argentine public forget about their declining economic status 
or their repression during the “dirty war” is highly unlikely. However, it seems that the invasion 
produced a temporary euphoria providing some manner of justification in the eyes of a large 
percentage of the population. It certainly did produce a unifying effect and brought together a 
nation that was falling apart. However, this was not the intention of the junta, as discussed in the 
previous section, and the magnitude of the effect was something the junta simply wasn’t ready 
for.[35]  
 
So great was this public support, that the junta found itself unexpectedly in a domain of gains, 
experiencing a level of public support it had not encountered since the coup of 1976. The only 
choice it had domestically was to pursue a domestically risk-averse course of action by carrying 
the invasion to its conclusion and defending the islands against the British task force. 
Withdrawing in the face of such nationalistic fervor would cause the junta to lose its last vestige of 
support from its domestic allies, namely the elite oligarchy whose backing it did need to continue 
authoritarian rule. This would have an effect comparable to losing a war,[36] and as discussed 
below, fighting the war gave it a realistic chance of victory, domestically and internationally. 
Winning the war would give it an extremely powerful bargaining chip in the transition to 
democracy, allowing the military to spell out the terms and likely establishing a tutelary role for 
itself.[37]  
If the military knew it was likely to lose a war with the British, then withdrawal from the islands 
would have been the safer option, for the losing regime in a war is subject to harsh treatment, 
internationally and domestically.[38] However, the Argentine armed forces actually had a 
relatively good chance of defeating the British based on numerous factors. First of all, the British 
were a declining world power, no longer the mighty global force of the 19th and early 20th century.  
Budgetary problems had led to a decrease of funds to the Admiralty, while Argentine military 
budgets had been rising since 1972. The force which the British sent to retake the islands was 
purely ad hoc, thrown together in a last minute effort to produce a fighting fleet.[39] Furthermore, 
the British navy of the early 1980s was overwhelmingly an anti-submarine force designed to fight 
with NATO in the North Atlantic against the Soviets, not to conduct long range full scale naval 
engagements and amphibious operations.[40] On the other hand, the Argentine navy was 
considerably better suited to conduct ship on ship warfare and had prepared its navy for such 
engagements in the South Atlantic against possible Brazilian and Chilean opponents.[41] It had 
built its fleet around the idea of being regionally dominant in the South Atlantic, and possessed a 
broad range of naval capabilities. Furthermore, the Argentines had a tremendous advantage in 
aircraft, allowing it to sortie land based aircraft, some of which could carry the Exocet anti-ship 
missile.  
In overall force structure for the operation, the Argentines had a narrow numerical advantage, in 
most areas,[42] though the British had a qualitative advantage in training and professionalism. 
However, it was questionable that training and professionalism could overcome the force ratio 
deficit the British faced; classically the attacker seeks a 3:1 ratio in offensive operations, but in 
ground troops the British found themselves numerically inferior, at 1:1.28. With the right 
preparations the Argentine position may have been unassailable without tremendous casualties 
for the attackers.  
That the British won the war, does not mean they had to, and that the Argentines chose poor 
strategic and tactical options[43] does not meant that the structural conditions for victory were not 
there. Many analysts at the time felt that the islands could not be retaken once captured.[44] The 
Argentines had a very real chance of winning an engagement with the British, thus fighting the 
war was a small gamble, but it was one with even odds, a “toss up.”[45] As Hastings and Jenkins 
put it, sending the task force against the better equipped Argentine fleet was “a strategic 
gamble.”[46]  
Conclusions and Lessons 
The commonly held belief that the Argentine junta invaded the Falklands to distract domestic 
attention away from declining economic and social conditions does not hold. Rather, the junta 
was responding to international stimuli hoping that an invasion would force the British to negotiate 
the transfer of sovereignty of the islands while the Argentines held a major trump card- 
possession.  
The junta did not want to fight a war. But once the British responded with force, the junta found 
itself locked in a situation in which it had no choice but to stay and fight, less its domestic alliance 
with the elite oligarchy collapse forcing it to negotiate a transition to democracy on less that 
acceptable terms. Both decisions were based on the junta’s perception of gains and losses, 
causing them to respond with risk aversion or risk seeking following the core tenets of prospect 
theory.  
This series of events has consequences that the First World must understand in order to avoid 
such confrontations in the future. It is important for policymakers in developed countries to 
understand the viewpoint of their counterparts in the Third World. If the British had understood 
that Argentines perceived the Falklands/Malvinas as a territorial possession, they would have not 
likely responded to urgent demands for negotiations with such nonchalance. They would have 
seen that the 150 year anniversary of British occupation of the islands would have been 
perceived in Buenos Aires as a major territorial loss, and been more willing to seek a final and 
acceptable outcome for both sides rather that toy with such dangerous sentiments as Argentine 
nationalism. The international community needs to understand how the Third World views gains 
and losses, lest it again push a nation so far into the domain of losses that it has no choice but to 
pursue risky—and likely aggressive—action. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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